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Network Issues and Payment Systems
James J. McAndrews*
Networks play an integral part in the pro-
duction and consumption of certain goods and
services, including transportation, communica-
tions, and payment systems. A network good
or service has two main characteristics: the
value a person gets from the product increases
as more people consume it and the technique a
firm chooses to produce the product will de-
pend on techniques chosen by other firms. For
example, consider a telephone system. The
greater the number of people connected by tele-
phone lines, the greater the number of people
any member of the system can call and the more
he or she will enjoy belonging to that telephone
network.  Similarly, firms that offer phone ser-
vice will produce switches and lines compat-
ible with those of other firms that offer phone
service, so that they can offer their customers
the valuable service of connecting to all other
parties.
It is helpful to think of network components
as nodes connected by links.1  Perhaps the most
transparent example is a railroad system, a
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1See the article by Nicholas Economides for a good sur-
vey of network economics and an example of an approach
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physical network composed of lines (the links)
that connect destinations (the nodes). A railroad
to one destination is of some value, but a rail-
road system that connects a traveler to many
destinations potentially has great value. To cre-
ate an extensive railroad system, regional rail
lines must use compatible gauges. This
complementarity between the components of
a network leads consumers to place a higher
value on larger networks and leads firms to take
into account the production decisions of their
rivals.
Other examples of physical networks include
highways, oil and natural gas pipelines, water
systems, and computerized airline reservation
systems. Certain information services also have
network characteristics. The Internet, for ex-
ample, can be thought of as a network in which
the computers are the nodes, and the software
and the telephone lines to which the comput-
ers are connected form the links that allow files
to be exchanged and seamlessly read by differ-
ent machines.
Payment systems, such as credit cards,
ATMs,  currency, and checks, are also examples
of network goods. Here, the nodes might be
merchants, consumers, and banks, which are
linked by the exchanges of information among
them. In some cases, such as in an ATM net-
work or a point-of-sale (POS) debit system, the
links may also consist of  telephone lines.  In
others, such as in the checking system, the links
consist of methods of delivery of the check from
the merchant to its bank, and from that bank,
through a clearinghouse (similar to a telephone
switching system), to the consumer’s bank. In
a credit card system, the complementarity be-
tween the components is obvious: as more
people use credit cards, more merchants are
induced to add terminals, since allowing cus-
tomers a convenient means of payment will
potentially increase their sales, and as more
merchants permit credit card payment, the
value to the customer of having a credit card
increases, too.
Economists have recently renewed their in-
terest in many of the unique issues that arise in
network-dependent industries. Below, we’ll
discuss some of these issues, including compat-
ibility and standard-setting among service pro-
viders, the role of an installed base of network
facilities, and access to network facilities.2  In
addition, the more common economic issues of
pricing policies, the tendency toward mo-
nopoly, and the introduction and adoption of
alternative technologies take on new dimen-
sions in network industries. Network econom-
ics is increasingly relevant in today’s economy
because of the growth of the communications
industry and the computer hardware and soft-
ware industries and the introduction of new
forms of payment systems such as electronic
money. An understanding of the economics of
networks and the unique features of network
goods gives insight into the organization of
markets for these goods and provides the basis
for formulating good business and public policy
concerning these goods.
Below, we’ll also analyze some payment-sys-
tem issues from the perspective of network eco-
nomics and show that formulating appropri-
ate public policy would be difficult without a
knowledge of the economics of payment net-
works.
NETWORK ISSUES
Not all goods have network characteristics.
For non-network goods, firms compete to be
the main producer, and the techniques one firm
uses in producing the goods need not be related
to the techniques used by other firms. Typically,
the firm that is the most efficient producer will
gain market share, and other firms will lose
2Among the many papers that explicitly analyze
network issues are those by Jeffrey Rohlfs, Joseph
Farrell and Garth Saloner, and Michael Katz and Carl
Shapiro.Are Bank Runs Contagious? Ted Temzelides
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market share or be driven from the market en-
tirely.  Moreover, the pleasure one person re-
ceives from purchasing the good would be the
same no matter how many other people pur-
chase it. Think of ice cream: different firms com-
pete to be the most popular brand, each using
a technique it believes produces the tastiest
product, and one person’s pleasure from eat-
ing a cone doesn’t depend on how many oth-
ers buy ice cream cones.
But the situation is different for network
goods. Consider a com-
munications system: if
one person uses Morse




ish, a coordinated sys-
tem of signals that can
be mutually understood
is necessary. So firms
that want to provide
some of these services
must consider what
other firms are provid-
ing. Rather than com-
peting, these firms’ de-
cisions complement one
another.3  Furthermore,
as more people adopt
the communication system, its value increases,
since it provides access to more people; this en-
courages larger networks.
Not only do the benefits increase as the net-
work expands, but the per unit cost of produc-
tion falls. One reason for the economies of scale
is that networks are often set up with central-
ized switching facilities to route delivery of ser-
vice. For example, in a local telephone network,
rather than stringing wires from each house to
all other houses, one line is strung from each
house through a series of trunk lines to a cen-
tral switch. As telephone traffic increases, the
cost per call declines, since the fixed cost of the
switch can be spread over more calls. This de-
cline in average cost encourages larger net-
works.
In the 1970s and 1980s, economists began to
recognize networks as distinct features of cer-
tain industries and subsequently outlined vari-
ous economic issues unique to these industries.
Compatibility. One
key to extending the size of
a network is the compat-
ibility of network compo-
nents. Networks combine
complementary compo-
nents of a technology that
makes possible the creation
of goods and services. But
the components’ compat-
ibility makes possible their
complementarity. For
many products, compat-
ibility can be achieved only
by adherence to technical
standards.
Take the case of  rail-
road gauges. U.S. railroads
employed different gauges
of track—the distance be-
tween the rails—for decades, necessitating the
use of costly devices (including laying third rails
in some cases, and having railroad cars with
adjustable axle widths) to transport goods
across different rail lines. In the 1830s, at the
beginning of intercity rail service in the United
States, three gauges emerged as the most popu-
lar. The three—4 feet 8.5 inches, 4 feet 10 inches,
and 5 feet—varied only slightly from one an-
other but were sufficiently different to prevent
the interchange of rolling stock (railroad cars
and engines). Hence, goods typically had to be
unloaded and reloaded as they were shipped
from one region’s lines to another’s.  As long
3This aspect of networks is made clear in the paper by
Philip Dybvig and Chester Spatt.
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as the volume of shipments between regions
was not too great, the different gauges could
survive.
From the 1840s through the 1860s, additional
gauges were introduced and survived, result-
ing in a balkanized railroad system. In a 1991
article, Douglas Puffert identified nine regions
of the country that, in the 1860s, used common
gauges within the region. By the 1890s, though,
U.S. railroads had fixed on 4 feet 8.5 inches
(called the standard gauge) as the measurement
for rails across the country.
Puffert explained the evolution of railroad
gauges in the United States in this way: In the
early years of railroad development, purely lo-
cal considerations were paramount. Railroads
were built to gain access to ports, rivers, canals,
and large regional markets and were not
interlinked with other railroads.  However, as
the industrialization of the United States pro-
ceeded in the post-Civil War period, the higher
cost of shipping goods across lines of different
gauges became more apparent. In the late 1880s,
those lines that did not use the standard gauge
decided voluntarily to move their rails to ad-
here to the standard gauge across the United
States. After that, an extensive system of car
interchange developed among the railroads.4
Underproduction. Another issue is the pos-
sible underproduction of network services. Eco-
nomic models suggest that market production
of network services may often be inefficiently
low because using a network imposes an exter-
nal effect on other users of that network, an ef-
fect these other users typically disregard in
making their own production decisions.5
Since expanding a network requires addi-
tional facilities, the new facilities create the pos-
sibility for new products and services. For ex-
ample, suppose a business installs a fax ma-
chine, adding one machine to an existing net-
work of 100 machines owned by other busi-
nesses. This installation allows the business to
send messages to 100 other businesses, which,
in turn, can send messages to the business with
the new fax machine. The existing fax machine
owners generally place a positive value on the
extra machine, but typically do not subsidize
its installation. And businesses deciding
whether to install a new fax machine would not
take into account the positive effect on other
businesses. Thus, an externality exists in the
purchase and use of network goods.6 Because
the prices for network goods and services do
not typically reflect this externality, the con-
sumption of network goods and services is ex-
pected to be inefficiently low in a competitive
market: A business might decide it is too ex-
pensive to install the new fax machine, even
though the value to the 100 other firms exceeds
the cost of the machine.
Standards. The process of setting standards
for network components is vital to achieving
the compatibility that makes network
complementarity fully possible. Setting stan-
dards can be done, as in the U.S. railroad case,
by the marketplace, through cooperation (in-
dustry forums on setting standards), or by the
government. Although the U.S. railroad indus-
4See the publications by Douglas Puffert; John Stover;
and George Taylor and Irene Neu for excellent analyses of
the history of U.S. railroads.
5This applies to models of markets with a competitive
or a monopolistic structure.
6An externality exists when the decisions or activities
of one entity affect, positively or negatively, the environ-
ment (excluding prices) of another. In the example in the
text, the firm’s decision to install a fax machine imposed a
positive externality on the 100 other firms because it in-
creased the ability of all the firms to communicate (and
hence do business) more efficiently and more quickly with
one another. The externality imposed by increasing network
traffic need not always be positive, however. Network fa-
cilities, like many other economic facilities, can become
congested: A negative externality is imposed when one
party increases network traffic when the network is already
operating at capacity.Are Bank Runs Contagious? Ted Temzelides
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try developed a standard gauge through mar-
ket forces at work over half a century, one ana-
lyst of the issue called for legislation to lead the
way in adopting one of the early gauges as a
standard. Puffert quotes an unsigned commen-
tary from an 1832 issue of the American Railroad
Journal:
It is a matter of regret with many of the
friends of railroad improvements that no
measure has been taken to insure a uni-
form width of track.  The advantages of
such uniformity must be perfectly
obvious...we are forced to conclude that
this discrepancy in the width of tracks will
ultimately produce an infinitude of vexa-
tion, transfers and delays which might
easily have been avoided.The establish-
ment of a particular width, by statute, in
two or three of the principal States, would
probably have influence sufficient to pro-
duce the desired uniformity in most cases
throughout the United States.
This commentator suggests the advantage of
a mandatory, or legislated, standard. The “in-
finitude of vexation,” occasioned by differing
gauges, that persisted for decades could have
been avoided. The disadvantage of the manda-
tory approach is that the legislature may de-
cide on an inferior gauge.
Today, many industries cooperate in setting
technical standards for products.  For example,
checks, smart cards, ATM cards, credit cards,
and other components of the payment system
are all carefully designed to maintain compat-
ibility among different network components
and providers of network services. The place-
ment of information on the magnetic stripe on
cards, the encryption devices and codes, and
other technical standards must be common
among the parties to a card-based payment for
the system to operate. A cooperative industry-
sponsored approach to standardization can
achieve rapid adoption of standards while al-
lowing those with the greatest interests and
technical expertise to participate in setting the
standards.
This type of cooperation among firms that
are essentially supplying various components
of an integrated product must be distinguished
from collusion among competitors, which leads
to price fixing and other anticompetitive out-
comes. The practical difficulty lies in correctly
identifying which type of cooperation is at
work.
Installed Base. Sometimes, a technology
used by an early leader in a network industry
can establish a dominance that gives it an ad-
vantage over alternative technologies in the
race for the industry standard. For example, the
gauge eventually set for American rails was the
early leader in number of miles of rail and the
one most often used in the more industrialized
Northeast and Midwest. This example reflects
the fact that, in network industries, a large in-
stalled base of network facilities has an inher-
ent advantage over new technologies that might
otherwise satisfy consumer demand.7 A technol-
ogy that wins an early lead can serve as a tem-
plate for other competing technologies: Those
compatible with it have an advantage, and
those not compatible have a disadvantage.
Furthermore, a large installed base of net-
work facilities can increase demand for a par-
ticular system. Consider the competition
among early telephone networks, which were
not interconnected. For example, in a city with
two telephone companies, the larger company
could offer its subscribers wider service, mak-
ing it unnecessary for those subscribers to pur-
chase both companies’ services. Hence,  a large
group of existing users enhances a system’s
chances for success.
Color television provides another example
of the effect an installed base has on the pat-
7Indeed, Puffert points out that railroad engineers are
still undecided on the technically preferred gauge.
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tern by which people adopt a system. Early on,
color TV was available in competing formats.8
The first system approved by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) in 1953 was
incompatible with black-and-white receivers,
and it never gained widespread acceptance.
Also in 1953, the FCC approved an alternative
system that was compatible with the existing
black-and-white television system, so that con-
sumers could receive programs transmitted in
either format. Because lo-
cal stations had to pur-
chase expensive equip-
ment to carry color pro-
gramming,  all programs
weren’t broadcast in color
until 1970. Had consum-
ers been forced to choose
between keeping their




each system, the transi-
tion to color television
would most likely have
been delayed. This faster
transition to color TV was
accomplished at the cost of what some consider
to be a lower quality system than others that
were possible.
The influence that a large installed base has
on the success of a network product points to
the importance of three other common features
in network industries: low introductory pric-
ing, the role of expectations, and leveraging a
firm’s dominance in one product to dominance
in another. All these potential business strate-
gies reflect the explicitly dynamic (time-depen-
dent) nature of network economics. The cur-
rent size of the installed base influences the
current demand for a service, but is itself the
result of past decisions of those who supply and
demand the service.
Low introductory pricing is a technique used
to build a large base of users quickly, and it’s a
common one among many firms in network
industries. If a firm succeeds in establishing its
brand quickly among a sizable base of users, it
has a good chance of charging higher prices to
later users, and the higher




which both firms initially
gave away their Internet
browser, can be under-
stood in this light.
The second feature re-
lated to an installed base
is the role of expectations.
When introducing new
products and marketing
existing ones, it’s impor-
tant to create expectations
among current and poten-
tial consumers that the
product will have a large installed base, even if
it doesn’t at present. For example, advertising
for credit cards touts their ubiquity. Many
people are establishing e-mail accounts, since
e-mail is expected to become a permanent
means of communication. For competitive
firms, using false advertising and falsely un-
dermining consumers’ expectations about a
rival’s products are techniques that can illegiti-
mately affect market expectations.
The success of compact disc players shows
the importance of expectations. The widespread
adoption of CD technology happened quickly,
even though compact disc players were incom-
patible with the existing record technology and
in spite of the installed base of record players.
A key difference between the case of color TV
8The article by Neil Gandal and Rafael Rob presents the
history of the adoption of color TV and compact disc play-
ers.
A well-established
network with a large
base of users can
extend a firm’s
dominance into
new products.Are Bank Runs Contagious? Ted Temzelides
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and that of CDs is that the firms that developed
the compact disc player, Philips and Sony,
jointly operated the first two plants for produc-
ing compact discs, ensuring a steady supply of
discs for the players to use. Unlike the case with
TV, recording studios did not have to purchase
costly equipment to produce music for compact
discs. Hence, potential purchasers could expect
that virtually all recorded music soon would
be available on compact discs, whereas some
TV programs were produced and broadcast
only in black and white for almost 20 years af-
ter the introduction of color TV.
A well-established network with a large base
of users can extend a firm’s dominance into new
products. A firm that controls a network prod-
uct can, in some cases, control the standard for
a complementary product by incorporating the
second product into its offering of the first. For
example, the maker of a dominant computer
operating system may incorporate more and
more “applications” software in each succeed-
ing generation of the operating system soft-
ware.  This tactic essentially leverages the abil-
ity of the provider of network services to influ-
ence the market’s choice of new technologies.
In some cases, of course, the dominant firm does
so by offering the best possible second prod-
uct, but this need not be the case. Indeed, by
limiting the ability of competitors to introduce
complementary (or next generation) products
that are compatible with current technology, the
dominant network’s provider can gain an ad-
vantage for its own complementary products
(which may be inferior to those sponsored by
competitors).
A more worrisome abuse of the power held
by a dominant network’s provider is tying the
sale of network services to ancillary products
that consumers would otherwise be able to buy
more cheaply from competing suppliers. In this
case, the dominant provider enjoys an advan-
tage because of the large base of users. Alterna-
tive providers of network services cannot com-
pete, since their small size makes their product
less valuable. Therefore, the dominant provider
can overcharge for ancillary services because
users will not defect to the alternative (smaller)
network.
In an anti-trust suit, the U.S. Department of
Justice accused Electronic Payment Services
(EPS), the operator of the MAC ATM network,
of tying the sale of ATM processing (an ancil-
lary product) to the sale of ATM network ac-
cess. In the 1994 consent decree, EPS agreed to
allow other processors to compete for that an-
cillary service.
Access. Once established, a network that has
a large base of users must determine which
firms will have access to its facilities, that is,
whether the network standard will be “open”
or “closed.”  With an open standard, many firms
can design and sell products compatible with
the standard; a closed system limits the num-
ber of firms that can use the standard to sell
products. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s,
bank customers began to have access to their
deposit accounts through ATMs. Most of these
systems were proprietary and therefore closed.
In the mid 1980s, many banks struck agree-
ments to share access to ATMs, thereby creat-
ing shared ATM networks—an open standard.
Successful networks can create a type of mo-
nopoly called bottlenecks or essential facilities.
By restricting access to such facilities, their
owners place competing producers of a service
at a significant competitive disadvantage. For
example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
directed the FCC to establish the detailed con-
ditions under which competitors to the “baby
Bells” could gain access to the local telephone
network’s lines and switches to provide tele-
phone service. Without mandated access, a lo-
cal phone network has little incentive to give
competing providers access to its facilities (even
at a cost). And without access to the local tele-
phone network, the alternative provider would
have to build a large network facility to attract
a critical mass of users. By denying access to its
competitors, the local network enjoys a consid-
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erable advantage over entrants into the mar-
ket. Such bottleneck monopolies have been suc-
cessfully challenged under the antitrust laws
of the United States.
APPLICATION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Recognition of the network characteristics of
payment systems can yield insight into impor-
tant public policy issues. To be successful, pay-
ment systems, which are technologies for the
exchange of value among participants, must
have wide acceptability. A card-based payment
product, whether a debit or credit card, requires
that consumers have the cards and that mer-
chants have authorization terminals. These two
pieces of equipment are complementary, and
the more terminals that retailers deploy, the
more potential transactions are available to a
cardholder. Currency and coin, too, require a
network of facilities for reading, counting, and
sorting so that bills and coins can be accepted
at vending machines.
The failure of the Susan B. Anthony $1 coin
can be better understood once we recognize the
dominance of the network effects that support
the dollar bill. John Caskey and Simon St.
Laurent argue that the popular explanation for
the failure of the $1 coin—that it was poorly
designed because it was hard to distinguish it
from the quarter—is suspect. Although the Su-
san B. Anthony coin is similar to the quarter in
terms of its color, reeded edge, and thickness,
it weighs 43 percent more than a quarter, has
the same size relationship to the quarter as the
quarter has to the nickel, and has distinctly dif-
ferent engraving from the quarter. Instead of
design, Caskey and St. Laurent focused on net-
work effects, primarily those involving vend-
ing machines. The $1 coin can make higher
value transactions easier in vending machines,
but only if vending machine owners spend the
resources necessary to convert their machines
to accept the coins. They will do so if they ex-
pect the public to use the coins. Likewise, the
public will use the coins if they expect them to
be widely accepted.  Neither of these expecta-
tions was met with the Susan B. Anthony be-
cause the $1 note remained in circulation.
In Canada, the adoption of a $1 coin (with
some alternative design attributes—in particu-
lar, a gold color) was similarly met with a dis-
appointing level of adoption, even though
Canada’s marketing campaign was much more
extensive than the one the United States used
for the Susan B. Anthony. However, the Bank
of Canada began withdrawing the $1 note, an
action that led vending machine companies to
rapidly convert their machines to accept the
coins. Today the $1 coin is the only circulating
dollar in Canada. This experience focuses at-
tention on the installed base of note users (and
the machines and system by which the notes
are handled). A large installed base that favors
notes makes it difficult to influence expectations
that the coin will gain general acceptance. And
wide acceptance is needed for a coin to displace
a successful (although more costly) note.
ATM networks yield numerous examples of
the importance of network effects. Dennis
Carlton and Alan Frankel offer one example of
how compatibility can increase network out-
put and convenience. They examine the output
effects of the merger of the two ATM networks
in Chicago—Cash Station and Money— in 1986.
They point out that such a merger can lead to
greater convenience and service because of the
complementarity of the network components:
the bank cards and ATMs. Carlton and Frankel
state, “As the number of participants and ter-
minals on the network increases, consumers
might still be better off as a result of the in-
creased network size and geographic density.
As the number of participants and terminals on
the network increases, consumers can rely more
on the network. The full cost of using ATM ser-
vices, including search costs and the risk of be-
ing unable to find an operating terminal, might
have fallen even if some fees increased.”
Carlton and Frankel also show that the num-
ber of machines on the network and the num-Are Bank Runs Contagious? Ted Temzelides
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ber of transactions conducted by the network’s
members increased at more than double the
national rate in the first full year following the
merger. In addition, when the seven years fol-
lowing the merger are looked at as a whole, the
number of machines and number of  transac-
tions increased faster than the national rate as
well.
The merger of those two ATM networks
made the cards of almost any Chicago bank
compatible with any machine in the Chicago
area, and it resulted in a significant increase in
output, an outcome consistent with the theory
of network effects.9
The recent growth of the “off-line” debit
cards of Visa and MasterCard presents us with
an example of the importance of an installed
base of network facilities. The Visa and
MasterCard off-line debit cards, also called
check cards, can be used at the point-of-sale
(POS) to electronically debit the cardholder’s
deposit account. Other POS card systems,
known as “on-line” debit, are offered by the
regional ATM networks, such as MAC, Honor,
Star, and Pulse. The primary technical differ-
ence is that the on-line systems use a personal
identification number (PIN), and the transac-
tion is routed to the cardholder’s bank for au-
thorization; the off-line systems use a signature
rather than a PIN and are routed to Visa and
MasterCard for authorization. The off-line
transactions typically are settled with the
cardholder’s bank within a few days after the
transaction, while on-line systems typically
settle the same day as the transaction or the
following day.
The off-line systems have piggybacked on
the extensive system of credit card authoriza-
tion devices in retail operations around the
world. Visa and MasterCard have insisted that
retailers accept their check cards as long as they
accept their credit cards. Off-line systems thus
have a huge network with which their cards
are compatible, resulting in great convenience
for consumers.
In contrast, on-line systems have had to sell
their product retailer by retailer. The retailer
(who may already have a credit card authori-
zation terminal) typically must purchase a PIN
pad. Furthermore, while the off-line systems are
accepted and have cardholders across the na-
tion, each on-line ATM/POS system is accepted
and has cardholders from only a particular re-
gion of the country. This more limited accep-
tance of the cards reduces their desirability for
some retailers. By leveraging the widespread
acceptability of the credit card authorization
systems, the off-line cards quickly became the
more heavily used of the two systems.
Some retailers have challenged Visa and
MasterCard over their requirement that retail-
ers must accept their check cards if they accept
their credit cards.  In an antitrust lawsuit, they
allege that the credit card associations are guilty
of an illegal tying arrangement, using their
dominance in credit card acceptance to acquire
dominance in the debit card marketplace. The
check card transactions of Visa and MasterCard
typically carry a higher fee for the retailer than
do the on-line POS card transactions of the re-
gional ATM/POS networks.
Another instance of the insight network eco-
nomics can provide is in the continued domi-
nance of the check for consumer bill payments
and business-to-business payments. Checks are
often derided as an inefficient means of pay-
ment compared with electronic alternatives.
Kirstin Wells estimates that the total cost to so-
ciety of a check is roughly double that of an
automated clearinghouse payment.
Why haven’t individual businesses and
banks done more to convince check writers
(possibly through sharing the potential cost
savings) to move to electronic payment? The
9My 1995 article points out similar effects after the par-
tial merger, the so-called duality agreement, between the
two largest national networks, Plus and Cirrus, in 1991.
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answer, in part, has to do with the large installed
base of network facilities and business practices
that support the check. The paper invoice that
usually accompanies a check payment is uni-
versally accepted and understood. The current
electronic alternative, electronic data inter-
change, is used only by a relatively small group
of banks and firms. Until an electronic alterna-
tive to the paper invoice is widely available and
gains dominance, payment by check will re-
main relatively convenient. And its very con-
venience reduces the incentives for firms to
adopt an alternative system.
CONCLUSION
Networks have characteristics that create
distinct business-policy issues for the provid-
ers and consumers of network services, includ-
ing compatibility, access to network facilities,
and the creation and exploitation of dominance
in the provision of network facilities.
The economics of networks is an important
advance in the economics of industrial organi-
zation, lending insight into important indus-
tries, including the payment system.  In pay-
ment systems, the need for compatible facili-
ties for the exchange of value gives rise to fun-
damental complementarities among system
facilities, which is the hallmark of network eco-
nomics.
Our understanding of the failure of the Su-
san B. Anthony dollar coin, the success of the
off-line debit cards of Visa and MasterCard, the
superior convenience of merged ATM systems,
and the difficulty of replacing the check as a
dominant means of  payment are all enhanced
by an understanding of network economics.
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